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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)c and § 78-3a-909. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the findings of fact and the evidence support the 
trial court's conclusions that: 1. the parents had abandoned 
N.A.M., 2. there was a failure of parental adjustment, 3. there 
had only been token efforts made by appellants to avoid being unfit 
parents, and 4. the mother had neglected N.A.M. and the father was 
unfit. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The appellants argue that this review is an issue of law 
reviewed for correctness. However, the appellants are challenging 
or ignoring the facts found and relied on by the court. The 
standard of review, therefore, requires the appellants to marshall 
the facts in support of the findings and then demonstrate that the 
court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the 
clear weight of the evidence. D.G. v. State, 938 P. 2d 298, 301 
(Ut. Ct. App. 1997); State in the Interest of T.J., 945 P.2d 158 
(Ut. Ct. App. 1997) and State in the Interest of M.W. 1998 WL 
876390 (Ut. Ct. App. 1998). 
1 
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STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann.78-3a-313.5(1) Mandatory petition for 
termination of parental rights. 
(1) For purposes of this section, "abandoned infant" 
means a child who is 12 months of age or younger whose 
parent or parents: 
(a) although having legal custody of the child, 
fail to maintain physical custody of the child without 
making arrangements for the care of the child; 
(b) have failed to maintain physical custody, 
and have failed to exhibit the normal interest of 
natural parent without just cause: or 
(c) are unwilling to have physical custody of 
the child. 
Utah Code Ann.78-3a-407. Grounds for termination of parental 
rights. 
The court may terminate all parental rights with 
respect to one or both parents if it finds any one of the 
following: 
(1) that the parent or parents have abandoned the 
child; 
(2) that the parent or parents have neglected or 
abused the child; 
(3) that the parent or parents are unfit or 
incompetent; 
(4) that the child is being cared for in an out-
of-home placement under the supervision of the court or 
the division, that the division or other responsible 
agency has made a diligent effort to provide appropriate 
services and the parent has substantially neglected, 
wilfully refused, or has been unable or unwilling to 
remedy the circumstances that cause the child to be in an 
out-of-home placement, and there is a substantial 
likelihood that the parent will not be capable of 
exercising proper and effective parental care in the near 
future; 
(5) failure of parental adjustment, as defined in 
this chapter; 
(6) that only token efforts have been made by the 
parent or parents: 1 
(a) to support or communicate with the 
child; 
(b) to prevent neglect of the child; 
4 
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(c) to eliminate the risk of serious 
physical, mental, or emotional abuse of the 
child; or 
(d) to avoid being an unfit parent; 
(7) the parent or parents have voluntarily 
relinquished their parental rights to the child, and the 
court finds that termination is in the child's best 
interest; or 
(8) the parent or parents, after a period of trial 
during which the child was returned to live in his own 
home, substantially and continuously or repeatedly 
refused or failed to give the child proper parental care 
and protection. 
Utah Code Ann.78-3a-408. Evidence of grounds for termination. 
(1) In determining whether a parent or parents have 
abandoned a child, it is prima facie evidence of 
abandonment that the parent or parents: 
(a) although having legal custody of the 
child, have surrendered physical custody of 
the child, and for a period of six months 
following the surrender have not manifested to 
the child or to the person having the physical 
custody of the child a firm intention to 
resume physical custody or to make 
arrangements for the care of the child; 
(b) have failed to communicate with the 
child by mail, telephone, or otherwise for six 
months; 
(c) failed to have shown the normal 
interest of natural parent, without just 
cause; or 
(d) have abandoned an infant as described 
in Section 78-3a-313.5. 
(2) In determining whether a parent or parents are 
unfit or have neglected a child the court shall consider, 
but is not limited to, the following circumstances 
conduct, or conditions: 
(a) emotional illness, mental illness, or 
metal deficiency of the parent that renders 
him unable to care for the immediate and 
continuing physical or emotional needs of the 
child for extended periods of time; 
(b) conduct toward a child of a 
physically, emotionally, or sexually cruel or 
abusive nature; 
(c) habitual or excessive use of 
intoxicating liquors, controlled substances, 
3 
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or dangerous drugs that render the parent 
unable to care for the child; 
(d) repeated or continuous failure to 
provide the child with adequate food, 
clothing, shelter, education, or other care 
necessary for his physical, mental, and 
emotional health and development by a parent 
or parents who are capable of providing that 
care. However, a parent who, legitimately 
practicing his religious beliefs, does not 
provide specified medical treatment for a 
child is not for that reason alone a negligent 
or unfit parent; 
(e) with regard to a child who is in the 
custody of the division, if the parent is 
incarcerated as a result of conviction of a 
felony and the sentence is of such length that 
the child will be deprived of a normal home 
for more than one year; or 
(f) a history of violent behavior. 
(3) If a child has been placed in the custody of the 
division and the parent or parents fail to comply 
substantially with the terms and conditions of a plan 
within six months after the date on which the child was 
placed or the plan was commenced, whichever occurs later, 
that failure to comply is evidence of failure of parental 
adjustment. 
(4) The following circumstances constitute prima 
facie evidence of unfitness: 
(a) sexual abuse, injury, or death of a 
sibling of the child, or of any child, due to 
known substantiated abuse or neglect by the 
parent or parents; 
(b) conviction of a crime, if the facts 
surrounding the crime are of such a nature as 
to indicate the unfitness of the parent to 
provide adequate care to the extent necessary 
for the child's physical, mental, or emotional 
health and development; 
(c) a single incident of life-threatening 
or gravely disabling injury to or 
disfigurement of the child; or
 ( 
(d) the parent has committed, aided, 
abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to 
commit murder of manslaughter of a child or 
child abuse homicide. 
i 
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Utah Code Ann. 78-3a-409. Specific considerations where child 
is not in physical custody of parent. 
(1) If a child is not in the physical custody of the 
parent or parents, the court, in determining whether 
parental rights should be terminated shall consider, but 
is not limited to, the following; 
(a) the physical, mental, or emotional 
condition and needs of the child and his 
desires regarding the termination, if the 
court determines he is of sufficient capacity 
to express his desires; and 
(b) the effort the parent or parents have 
made to adjust their circumstances, conduct, 
or conditions to make it in the child's best 
interest to return him to his home after a 
reasonable length of time, including but not 
limited to: 
(i) payment of a reasonable 
portion of substitute physical care 
and maintenance, if financially 
able; 
(ii) maintenance of regular 
visitation or other contact with the 
child that was designed and carried 
out in a plan to reunite the child 
with the parent or parents; and 
(iii) maintenance of regular 
contact and communication with the 
custodian of the child. 
(2) For purposed of this section, the court shall 
disregard incidental conduct, contributions, contacts, 
and communications. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
N.A.M. was born to the appellants (parents) on April 22, 1996. 
Based on a referral from the hospital, N.A.M. was taken into the 
custody of the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) at her 
birth. N.A.M. was returned to the parents under protective 
supervision for a short time. Because of concerns about the 
physical environment of the parents, including problems reflected 
5 
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in an evaluation and the parents' lack of ability to operate a 
heart monitor and perform CPR, N.A.M. was taken back into 
protective custody. On June 12, 1996, an adjudication and 
disposition hearing was held. The parents admitted the allegations 
in the petition and N.A.M. was placed in the temporary custody of 
the State. N.A.M. was placed by the state in the foster care of 
Alarik (Rick) and Staci Myrin. Reunification services were 
provided until a court hearing on April 23, 1997. Because the 
parents' problems had not been remedied, and in fact, had become 
worse, the court ordered that reunification services cease. On May 
8, 1997, the State of Utah filed a petition to terminate the 
appellants' parental rights. The foster parents, Rick and Staci 
Myrin, joined in that petition and filed their own Petition to 
Terminate Parental Rights pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-404(1) 
on May 8, 1997. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition at the Trial Court. 
Trial on the petition to terminate parental rights was held on 
October 28 and 29, 1997. At the conclusion of the hearing, the 
court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law, setting 
forth several grounds for terminating the appellants' parental 
rights. The court then entered its order on December 1, 1997 
terminating the appellant's parental rights. This appeal followed. 
6 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
N.A.M. was born April 22,1996. At the time of her birth, she 
had a serious medical condition which required the use of a heart 
monitor. T. 47. The parents were unable to care for N.A.M., or 
operate the necessary equipment to monitor her heart condition. 
The hospital made a referral to the Division of Child and Family 
Services (DCFS) . As a result of the referral, N.A.M. was placed in 
foster care while the parents received training on how to care for 
her. The parents proved unable to learn the techniques necessary 
to maintain their daughter's health. This, as well as additional 
problems in their home, resulted in N.A.M. being taken into 
protective custody. The Adjudication and Disposition hearing was 
held June 12, 1996. 
At the Adjudication and Disposition hearing, the parents 
admitted the allegations in the petition. The court ordered that 
N.A.M. be placed in the temporary custody of the State of Utah and 
a reunification plan was to be implemented. A service plan was 
established which included peer parenting to establish parenting 
skills, creating and maintaining a home appropriate for a new-
born, training for CPR and heart monitoring, and visitation with 
the child. Exhibit 3. 
Psychological evaluations were performed in May 1996 on each 
parent by Intermountain Specialized Abuse Treatment Centers. 
Exhibits 6 and 7. The conclusion on Dennis Mace was that "[i]t 
1 
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appear[ed] unlikely that Dennis would be able to adequately care 
for his child without considerable assistance." The evaluation 
further noted that "Dennis should not be allowed to care for his 
child unless supervised by another adult." Exhibit 6 The 
evaluation on Amy Mace was that she had "the learning and 
understanding skills to care for N.A.M., if sufficiently motivated 
to do so." The study recommended that (due Amy's defensiveness, 
minimizing, lack of insight and other testing results), she be 
required to: 1. Provide a clean, healthy environment for N.A.M., 
2. Attend a parenting program, 3. That in-home assistance be 
provided to teach her to care for N.A.M., and, 4. Complete an 
intensive therapy program to learn parenting skills and to deal 
with her previous abuse problems. Exhibit 7, page 6. 
Pat Fox (Gordon) was assigned as the peer parent. T.49 
Extensive visits were made by Pat Fox to train the parents. T.156 
On July 12 - 13, 1996 an overnight visit was scheduled with the 
parents and N.A.M. T.59-60 The parents called Pat Fox repeatedly 
because of their inability to handle the heart monitor. T.332 One 
of the problems was that they forgot to plug the machine into the 
electrical outlet. T.375 
After that overnight visit the parents started showing a lack 
of interest T.64-65. They would resist the training by the peer 
parent T.328, were reluctant to hold N.A.M., and stated that they 
did not want N.A.M. T.336. The parents also showed a lack of 
8 
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ability to remember the instructions given to them by the peer 
parent T.372. Also, during this period of time, an aunt, with whom 
the parents lived, started caring for the baby instead of the 
parents. 
In conjunction with the deficiencies the parents demonstrated 
with their child care training, they continued to fail to recognize 
the importance of a healthy environment for their child. The 
parents persisted in residing with an individual with a 
substantiated sex abuse referral, and the house did not even meet 
basic standards of cleanliness. T. 71,133,380 
Near the end of August 1996, the parents moved, without any 
notice to DCFS, and lost all contact with DCFS. T. 70-73 The worker 
assigned by DCFS (William McCairn) attempted to locate the parents. 
He called their attorney several times. T.77-78 The parents had 
not even informed their own attorney of their address or telephone 
number T.457. In late October, 1996, Mr. McCairn came in contact 
with N.A.M.'s parents while visiting a home on a different case 
T.76. He requested that they contact him. He heard nothing from 
the parents. In December, Mr McCairn, attempted to locate the 
parents by searching the Town of Myton. T.79 
A court review hearing was scheduled for December 18, 1996. 
The parents were in attendance. From August 23 through December 
18, 1996, the parents had not complied with the treatment plan. 
T.151. They had not visited N.A.M. or had any other type of 
9 
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contact from August 23 through December 1996 (four months) T.81. 
They had no contact with DCFS and no peer parenting training during 
that time period T.136. During that four month time period, they 
showed no interest in N.A.M., or in improving their ability to care 
for her. At the review hearing, the court ordered that efforts 
continue to reunify the parents and N.A.M.. Following the court 
hearing on December 18, 1996, the new DCFS worker, Jennifer 
Johnson, asked the parents to schedule a visit. T.204 The 
parents did not schedule a visit. Ms. Johnson then called the 
parents' attorney to schedule a visit T.205. Finally, on January 
2, 1997, DCFS was able to arrange a visit between the parents and 
N.A.M. T.206 
A new service plan was developed (Exhibit 3) . The service 
plan included parenting classes, WIC nutrition classes, peer 
parenting, and supervised visits. The parents were also to work 
toward improving their financial condition and become self 
sufficient. The DCFS worker, Jennifer Johnson, read the plan to 
the parents and discussed it in detail. She explained that there 
was only a short time period left to develop the ability to care 
for N.A.M. and that they had to be serious and comply with the 
plan. T. 212-216, Exhibit 3 Ms. Johnson and the peer parent set up 
parenting classes on two occasions, including a private parenting 
class. T.208, 220, 252-254, 341. The parents refused to attend 
either of the parenting classes. The parents were given the 
10 
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information regarding the WIC nutrition class. The parents refused 
to attend the nutrition class. Jennifer Johnson testified that 
Amy, the mother, seemed terrified of N.A.M., that the parents made 
no efforts to comply with the plan, and that they did not seem to 
be serious about wanting N.A.M. in their home. T.213. The only 
compliance with the plan (visits and peer parenting) were 
instituted by DCFS who would take the child and peer parent to the 
parents' home. Even with DCFS scheduling the visits, the parents 
canceled some, and often were not home or were late for the 
scheduled visit T.271. 
Supervised visits were held on January 2, January 9, and 
February 6, 1997. During that time period it was the conclusion of 
the DCFS worker that the parents were not complying with the 
treatment plan T. 234. A new DCFS worker, Erin Williams, was 
assigned to the case at the end of February, 1997. She also 
attempted to arrange parenting classes, and set up visits. The 
parents' visits were sporadic and often canceled T.259-263. 
The peer parent, Pat Fox, again went into the home from 
February through April 1997 to show and teach the parents parenting 
skills and how to care for N.A.M. T.340. Pat Fox found that there 
had been no improvement in the parenting skills and that nothing 
had been retained from the parenting skills that were taught in 
June and July 1996. T.372 Furthermore, the peer parent found 
that each time she had to repeat the instructions from the previous 
11 
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visit as the parents seemed unable or unwilling to retain the 
instructions. T.378 The parents seemed overwhelmed, detached and 
not interested. N.A.M. also did not tolerate the visits very well. 
T.345, 377 
The parents were not complying with the second service plan by 
failing to attend parenting classes, failing to attend the WIC 
nutrition classes, failing to make efforts to improve financially 
and failing to follow the instructions and learn the parenting 
skills taught by the peer parent. The court therefore ordered that 
reunification services cease as of April 23, 1997. A change was 
made in the permanency plan to place N.A.M. for adoption. 
Therefore, in May 1997 a petition to terminate parental rights was 
filed by the State of Utah which was joined in by the foster 
parents (Myrins). The Myrins also filed their own petition to 
terminate parental rights. The parents made no effort to have 
contact with N.A.M. from April 3, 1997 until the trial on October 
28, 1997. N.A.M. has lived with the foster parents, the Myrins 
her entire life. T.153 
A bonding study was prepared in March 1997 by Craig Ramsey, a 
bonding evaluator expert. (Exhibit 5) His findings were that 
N.A.M. did not function well with the natural parents, that she 
exhibited stress and showed stranger anxiety T.175, Exhibit 5, that 
there was no significant bonding with the natural parents and that 
N.A.M. showed a preference to be with the evaluator rather than the 
12 
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natural parents. T.182 The bonding of N.A.M. was with the foster 
parents. He further found that the parents lacked basic parenting 
skills. Exhibit 5 The responses of N.A.M. toward the natural 
parents clearly demonstrated either that there had been infrequent 
visits or the visits had not been safe or productive. T.191 The 
expert expressed his professional opinion that removal of N.A.M. 
from the foster parents would cause significant trauma to N.A.M. 
and that N.A.M. would not function and develop properly in the care 
of the natural parents. T. 174-192 and Exhibit 5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court found that the parents did not avail themselves of 
necessary training relating to parenting skills and use of a heart 
monitor, that the parents exhibited a lack of interest in N.A.M., 
that the parents did not retained parenting skills taught by the 
peer parent, that the parents living conditions were unacceptable 
because they were living with relatives or others who were 
unacceptable due to substantiated sex abuse charges or who's homes 
did not meet basic minimum standards of cleanliness, that the 
parents lost interest in N.A.M., visited sporadically and went 
months without contact with DCFS or N.A.M., that the parents failed 
to comply with two service plans, that the parents failed to 
participate in parenting classes and WIC services on nutrition 
provided to them, that there is no bonding and no parent child 
relationship between the parents and N.A.M. and that the only 
13 
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parent N.A.M. knows and is bonded to is her foster parents. Those 
factual findings support all the reasons provided by law and found 
by the court to terminate the parent's parental rights. 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANTS CANNOT CHALLENGE THE FINDINGS OF FACT WITHOUT 
MARSHALING THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THOSE FINDINGS OF FACT. 
ALTERNATIVELY, APPELLANTS CANNOT CLAIM THAT THE FINDINGS OF FACT DO 
NOT SUPPORT THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW BY IGNORING THE FINDINGS OF FACT 
THAT SUPPORT THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
Appellants' primary arguments (Arguments A thru D) are that 
the findings of fact do not support the trial court's conclusions 
of law. That argument fails, not only because it is untrue, but 
because appellants ignore the findings of fact that support the 
court's conclusion. Appellants cannot challenge the sufficiency of 
their disputed findings of fact without marshaling the facts in 
support of those findings. The appellants admit that the trial 
court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous. See page 14 of 
Appellant's Brief. Despite that admission the appellants then 
proceed to rely on their version of the facts without marshaling 
all the evidence in support of the findings of fact. D.G. v. 
State, 938 P.2d 298, 301 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); State in the 
Interest of T.J., 945 P.2d 158 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) and State in 
the Interest of M.W. 1998 WL 876390 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Examination of the court's findings shows that there are 
several grounds upon which to terminate the appellants' parental 
rights. Those grounds include: a) abandonment of the child because 
14 
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of the parents' conscious disregard of their parental obligations, 
which led to destruction of the parent/child relationship; b) 
neglect of the child by the mother; c) the unfitness or 
incompetence of the father making him unable to care for N.A.M. for 
extended periods of time; d) the unwillingness or inability of the 
parents to remedy the circumstances that caused N.A.M. to be 
removed from the parents' home; e) the substantial likelihood that 
the parents would not be capable of providing proper parental care 
in the near future; f) the lack of concern demonstrated by the 
parents to make appropriate parental adjustments by failing to 
comply with two different service plans; and g) the token efforts 
or no efforts made by the parents to remedy the deficiencies in 
their parenting skills. 
Even though the court found several grounds to terminate the 
parental rights, only one is necessary to sustain the court's 
termination of parental rights. Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-407; see also 
State v J.N. , 920 P.2d 430 (Utah App. 1998). The appellants do not 
challenge the court's findings and conclusions regarding the best 
interest of N.A.M. that she be adopted by the foster parents. 
The issue therefore, is whether the findings of fact support 
the court's decision to terminate parental rights. A review of the 
evidence shows that the findings of fact clearly support all the 
grounds used by the court to terminate the parental rights. 
15 
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II. APPELLANTS' FAILURE TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH N.A.M. , FAILURE 
TO SHOW THE NORMAL INTEREST OF A PARENT IN N.A.M., FAILURE TO 
COMPLY WITH SERVICE PLANS, FAILURE TO LEARN BASIC PARENTING SKILLS, 
AND REFUSAL TO ATTEND PARENTING AND NUTRITION CLASSES RESULTED IN 
NO DEVELOPMENT OF THE PARENT/CHILD RELATIONSHIP. THE ONLY PARENTS 
KNOWN TO N.A.M. ARE HER FOSTER PARENTS WITH WHOM SHE HAS LIVED 
SINCE HER BIRTH MORE THAN THREE YEARS AGO. 
A. The Appellants Abandoned N.A.M. by Refusing to Maintain 
Contact with Her and by Showing Very Little Interest in Her. 
The trial court concluded that the parents had abandoned 
N.A.M. as defined in Utah Code Ann. 78-3a-407 (1) . That, as a 
result of the parents' conscious disregard of their parental 
obligations, the parent child relationship had been destroyed. See 
Conclusion of Law A. Abandonment includes failure to communicate 
with the child for a period of six months or failure to maintain 
physical custody and then failure to show the normal interest of a 
natural parent without just cause. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3a-408(l) 
and 78-3a-313.5. 
Numerous findings of fact support that conclusion, including 
the fact that there had been no visitation or contact with N.A.M. 
from August 1996 until January 2, 1997 and from April 3, 1997 
through October 28, 1997, the date of the trial. See Findings of 
Fact L, Q and V. Numerous findings of fact clearly illustrate the 
parents' failure to show a natural parent's interest in N.A.M. The 
court concluded that this evidenced a lack of a parent child 
relationship. The findings of the court include consideration by 
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the court of the failure of the parents to comply with the service 
plans, the failure of the parents to make efforts to develop 
parenting skills, and the significant periods of time in which the 
parents did not maintain contact with the N.A.M.. This pattern of 
behavior by the parents continued despite extensive efforts by DCFS 
to reunify N.A.M. and the parents. The bonding study in March 1997 
showed that there was no relationship between the parents and 
N.A.M.. This lack of relationship was caused by the appellants' 
multiplicity of failures, including a failure to show an interest 
in N.A.M. 
B. The Mother Neglected N.A.M. by Refusing to Develop Basic 
Parenting Skills. Her Lack Of Skills Made Her Incapable of 
Providing For N.A.M.'s Most Basic Needs. 
The trial court also concluded that the mother had neglected 
N.A.M. In reaching that conclusion, the court relied on Utah Code 
Ann.§ 78-3a-409. The court concluded that the mother had failed to 
provide N.A.M. "with adequate food, clothing, shelter, education or 
other care necessary for the physical, mental and emotional health 
and development of the child/7 Conclusion of Law B. 
Appellants argue that there were no facts to support that 
conclusion, claiming that the appellants always had food and a home 
available for N.A.M.. In making that argument, appellants ignore 
the court's findings that the appellants, at times, did not even 
have a home that met minimum cleanliness standards, (Finding of 
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Fact J) that they, at times, resided with relatives who were 
unacceptable or with an individual with a substantiated sex abuse 
history, (Finding of Fact J), and that, for a significant period of 
time, they had no home or at least failed to provide any 
information about their living arrangements to DCFS. (Finding of 
Fact K). 
Appellants also ignore the court's conclusions (and the law) 
that neglect also includes the failure to provide other care 
necessary for the physical, mental, and emotional health and 
development of N.A.M.. The psychological evaluation on the mother 
showed that she was capable of learning parenting skills. Finding 
the Fact M and Exhibit 6. Despite that ability, the mother did not 
avail herself of the necessary training on the heart monitor, 
(Finding of Fact C), she showed a lack of interest in caring for 
N.A.M., (Finding of Fact F), she did not try to learn parenting 
skills, showed a lack of interest in N.A.M., and eventually lost 
contact with N.A.M. and DCFS from August through December, 1996. 
(Findings of Facts F and I thru L) . The court also found that, 
despite extensive efforts in January thru March 1997, the mother 
did not attend parenting classes and did not avail herself of 
training on nutrition. (Finding of Fact R) The bonding study 
indicated that the lack of effort by the mother resulted in no 
bonding between N.A.M. and the mother and that the emotional, 
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physical and mental health and development of N.A.M. had been 
provided solely by the foster parents. (Findings of Fact N, T, V) . 
C. The Psychological Evaluation of the Father Showed that he 
is Unfit as a Parent. 
The trial court concluded that the father was unfit or 
incompetent in that his mental deficiency rendered him unable to 
care for the immediate and continuous physical and emotional needs 
of N.A.M. for an expanded period of time. (Conclusion of Law C). 
That conclusion is fully supported by the psychological evaluation 
of the father (Exhibit 7), and Finding of Fact M which is based on 
that evaluation. 
Appellants' argument on this point is misplaced on two counts. 
Their first error is that the court's Conclusion of Law did not 
apply to the mother. The second error is that Appellants' argument 
relies on Utah Code Ann. 78-3a-408 (4) , while ignoring Utah Code 
Ann. 78-3a-408 (2)a, the statutory basis the court used. 
D. Appellants Did Not Comply With the Service Plans Developed 
to Help Them Develop Parenting Skills. 
The trial court concluded that, despite diligent efforts by 
DCFS, that there had been a failure of parental adjustment by the 
parents. (Conclusions of Law D and E) Because those Conclusions of 
Law are supported by the Findings of Fact and the record, the 
Appellants argue that the issue of parental adjustment should be 
limited to whether the parents were able to learn to operate the 
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heart monitor.1 Failure of parental adjustment is not limited 
only to the initial concern that gave rise to the removal of the 
child. S.L. v State, 965 P.2d 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Even if 
that were the law, the ability to operate the heart monitor was 
only one of the reasons N.A.M. was removed from Appellants' care. 
The Shelter, Adjudication and Disposition Order from the hearing of 
June 12, 1996 found, based on the admissions of the parents, that 
the physical environment of the parents posed a threat to the 
health and safety of N.A.M. and that leaving N.A.M. in the home 
would be contrary to her welfare. The court directed the 
establishment of a treatment plan to try and remedy those problems. 
Prior to that hearing, the psychological evaluations had been 
performed which also showed problems with the parents' abilities to 
care for N.A.M. 
A determination of a failure of parental adjustment requires 
findings that the parents were unable or unwilling, within a 
reasonable time, to substantially correct the circumstances, 
conduct or conditions that led to the child being outside the home. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 78-3a-403 (2) , S.L. v State, 965 P.2d 551 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998) and State in the Interest of G.D., 894 P.2d 1278 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995). A parent's failure to substantially comply with a 
xThe parents initially appeared to have learned how to 
operate the heart monitor, but, when left on their own at the 
July overnight visit, they did not even plug it into the 
electrical outlet and had to call the peer parent repeatedly to 
assist them with the heart monitor. 
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service plan is evidence of the failure of parental adjustment. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-408 (3) ; State in the Interest of G.D. Supra. 
The Findings of Fact show that a service plan was developed 
following the Adjudicative hearing in June 1996 (Finding of Fact 
E) . The Findings show that peer parenting was set up with the peer 
parent, who was on call. The peer parent visited the parents 
thirteen out of the first thirty days. The Findings show that the 
peer parent provided training on the monitor, that the home was 
visited and inspected by DCFS and that the parents received 
attention from DCFS thirty-three different times from June 12 thru 
August 30 (Findings of Fact F thru J) . Despite such extensive and 
intensive efforts by DCFS, the parents failed to comply with the 
service plan and simply disappeared for three and a half months. 
(Finding of Facts K and L). When the parents resurfaced in late 
December of 1996, a second service plan was prepared. Again, a 
peer parent went back into the home, and parenting classes and 
nutrition classes were provided. Again, the parents failed to 
comply with the second service plan. They failed to go to the 
parenting class established by DCFS, they failed to attend the 
nutrition classes, they failed to maintain a regular visitation 
schedule and failed to learn any parenting skills. (Findings of 
Fact 0 through U) 
The court's conclusion that, despite reasonable and 
appropriate efforts by DCFS to return N.A.M. to the parents, the 
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parents failed to comply with the two service plans and had not 
remedied the conditions that caused the removal of the child from 
the home, is supported by the record and should be sustained. 
E. The Appellants Did Not Make Even Token Efforts to Learn How to 
Care for N.A.M. or to Show An Interest in N.A.M. 
The court further found that the parents had made only token 
efforts and, in some cases, no, effort to support or communicate 
with N.A.M., to eliminate the risk of serious physical, menta or 
emotional abuse and to avoid being unfit. Utah Code Ann. §78-38-
407(6). The appellants argue that their visits with the peer 
parent, training on the heart monitor and the psychological 
evaluations were more than token efforts. 
In reality, the visits with the peer parent and the training 
on the monitor were not even token efforts. The psychological 
evaluations were in May 1996 to provide information and had 
nothing to do with avoiding being unfit parents. During the visits 
with the peer parent, the parents retained no parenting skills, 
showed lack of interest, and had no contact with the peer parent 
for significant periods of time. The parents failed to attend 
parenting classes, failed to attend nutrition classes, failed to 
work with the peer parent and retain parenting skills, visited only 
sporadically and showed no interest in developing the skills that 
would help them to be fit parents. Such action, or lack thereof, 
demonstrates their lack of commitment to this child. 
22 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
III. APPELLANTS' ARGUMENTS AT POINTS F AND 6 ARE IMMATERIAL TO THE 
COURTS' CONCLUSIONS TERMINATING PARENTAL RIGHTS. 
Appellants' arguments at points F and G of their brief are 
immaterial to the issues before the Court. Appellants' argument F 
that the father had ability to care for himself has no relevance to 
the issues at hand. It was undisputed (and the psychological 
evaluation determined) that he is unable to care for N.A.M. 
Appellants' argument G as to whether the parents attended six 
rather than five parenting classes taught by the sister of their 
attorney is immaterial. They failed to attend the parenting 
classes set up by DCFS and never learned the basic skills needed to 
parent N.A.M. 
CONCLUSION 
The court found that both parents' rights should be terminated 
because of abandonment, failure of parental adjustment, and making 
only token efforts to avoid being an unfit parent. In addition, 
the court found that the mother had neglected N.A.M. and the father 
was unfit. Each of those grounds, alone, is sufficient to sustain 
the court's termination of the parental rights. Each of those 
grounds is supported by the Findings the Fact and the record. 
As this Court said in N.T. vs. State 928 P.2d 393, 401, 
(Utah App.1996) N.A.M. "deserve(s) a stable, structured environment 
with parents able to nurture, love, and provide for (her) special 
needs." N.A.M. "cannot remain in legal limbo indefinitely where 
there is no reasonable likelihood of [her] parents gaining 
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necessary parenting abilities/' S.L. v. State, 965 P.2d 551, 561 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998). The only parents that N.A.M. has known are 
Rick and Staci Myrin, her foster parents. There has been no 
question by any of the parties to these proceedings N.A.M. is 
bonded to the Myrins and that it is in the best interest of N.A.M. 
that she be adopted by the Myrins. 
It is requested that the Court sustain the termination of the 
appellants' parental rights. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 20th day of April, 1999. 
McKEACHNIE, ALLRED, 
McCLELLAN & TROTTER, P.C. 
Attorneys for Appellees 
By: 
By: 
:iark B Allred 
McClellan 
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EIGHTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of 
NICOLE ANN MACE (4-22-96) 
A Child Under 18 Years of Age 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No.: 909850 
I. FINDINGS OF FACT 
Nicole Mace was born on April 22,1996 to Dennis Mace and Amy Opsahl. Hospital staff made 
a referral to the Division of Child & Family Services (hereinafter DCFS) based on a lack of bonding 
between the mother and baby, and a need for special care relative to a heart monitor. The child was 
taken into custody on April 24, 1996 and a petition for custody filed by DCFS was adjudicated on 
June 5, 1996. The court returned the child to the parents under Protective Supervision. The child 
was hospitalized on June 5 and hospital staff refused to release her to her parents until the parents 
were trained in CPR and in the operation of the heart monitor. Because the parents did not avail 
themselves of the necessary training, a new petition was filed on June 10 seeking that custody be 
placed with DCFS. 
The baby was taken into protective custody on June 10 for the second time pursuant to this 
second petition. Up to that time she had been in DCFS custody or in the hospital, but never in the 
parents' custody. Temporary custody was granted by the court on June 12, 1996, after which DCFS 
began to implement a reunification plan which consisted of visitation between the parents and the 
baby as often as possible, establishment of a home appropriate for a newborn, having the parents learn 
parenting skills, CPR skills and heart and breath monitor skills. While this written treatment plan was 
very poorly drafted, almost devoid of the specificity necessary to be understood and carried out by 
low functioning parents, nevertheless DCFS made diligent efforts to provide services. A peer parent 
was provided to supervise visits and to teach parents appropriate parenting techniques. Peer 
parenting is an expensive and intensive program where an individual spends time with the parents, 
often daily, and often at all hours of the night, teaching them basic minimum parental functions which 
competent parents may take for granted, such as not feeding a newborn solid foods, changing diapers 
periodically, and how to bathe a baby. This peer parenting began immediately on June 12 with the 
goal of reuniting the baby with the parents as soon as possible. Initially the parents exhibited a lack 
of interest in caring for the baby, though limited progress was made. 
Monitor training was arranged, the home was visited and inspected by DCFS, psychological 
evaluations for the parents were scheduled, and the DCFS worker and peer parent spent considerable 
time teaching and advising parents on things they needed to do. Visits of the child to the home 
gradually increased until overnight visits were allowed with the worker checking on the family late 
at night and early in the morning. The peer parent was in the home on thirteen different days within 
the first 30 days or so, and was on call whenever the parents had questions. She needed to be present 
or available to come to the home when the baby was there. Through June, July and August of 1996, 
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the parents passed the monitor training and visits were fairly regular. However, as time went on, the 
aunt, with whom the parents were living, began to handle the baby during visits, and on some 
occasions the parents weren't even present. When they were present the peer parent was frustrated 
that basic parenting skills had to be taught over and over again at each visit because the parents 
weren't retaining what they had been taught. 
The parents' living arrangements were unacceptable to DCFS because they were living with 
various relatives or others who were either unacceptable themselves because of prior substantiated 
sex abuse referrals or who's homes did not meet basic minimum standards of cleanliness. The family 
received attention from DCFS in one form or another on 33 different days from June 12 to August 
30. 
In late August the parents appeared to begin to lose interest in the baby. The parents accepted 
the responsibility of requesting further visits. Visits became sporadic and then ceased. The parents 
continued to have unstable living arrangements. At one point DCFS and the parents' attorney lost 
track of the parents altogether because of their moving. They told the peer parent they were moving 
but wouldn't say where, so they were instructed to call when they were ready for visits to resume. 
They had no phone or transportation so communications ceased. 
As the first treatment plan drew to a close at the end of 1996, the parents had complied with 
the requirement of receiving the monitor training and had recently (on December 18) obtained 
suitable housing. They were in non-compliance with visitation and learning parenting skills. There 
were no visits whatsoever between August 27 and December 18, though there would have been visits 
arranged anytime the parents had asked or even made their whereabouts known. Without visits it was 
not possible for the peer parent to teach parenting skills. There was no other regular contact or 
communication with the baby during this period. 
Psychological assessments had been completed on both parents, the conclusions of which were 
that while the father lacked the cognitive abilities to care for himself without adult assistance, let alone 
care for and protect a baby, the mother was capable of learning parenting skills. 
Meanwhile the baby had been with the same foster parents since three days after her birth, was 
developing love, affection and emotional ties to those foster parents and was becoming integrated into 
the foster family to the extent that her family identification was becoming that of the foster family. 
The foster home was stable and satisfactory. The baby was ahead developmental^ and had 
outgrown the need for the heart and breath monitor. She recognized the foster parents as fulfilling 
the roles of parents in her life. 
As second reunification treatment plan was implemented with a beginning date of January 1, 
1997, although the parents' signatures bear the date of February 6, 1997. This treatment plan had 
more detail than the first one and therefore it was more easily understood and helpful to the parents. 
Visitation was still the key factor in reunification with the first four visits specified to be held at the 
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DCFS office for one hour, all to be completed within four weeks. Thereafter the visits were allowed 
in the parents' home and could be longer. Transportation and cancellation policies were clear, as was 
designation of who could be present, and who was to supervise the visits. 
In addition, parenting classes were required, as well as appropriate housing, peer parenting, and 
a vague requirement to "explore occupational and educational opportunities" and to "plan financially 
for their family and work towards self-sufficiency." 
Visits were re-established for December 23 but the parents' attorney failed to notify the parents 
and the first visit since August was January 2, 1997. Visits on January 16 and January 22 were both 
canceled because the baby was sick. Visits did take place on January 2, January 9 and February 6, 
with no substantial problems but with some concerns. The parents canceled the visits for January 30 
and February 13. 
During the months of January and February 1997 the parents failed to attend any parenting 
classes though everything had been arranged by DCFS for the parents to attend; nor did the parents 
make any efforts toward exploring occupational or educational opportunities or in doing any financial 
planning to work toward self-sufficiency. The social worker went over the treatment plan very 
carefully with the parents to be sure that they understood and emphasized the urgency of immediately 
establishing a relationship with the baby. The parents did have clean and adequate housing. They 
failed to avail themselves of WIC (Well Infant Child) services which were free of cost to the parents, 
even though the social worker requested them to do so. 
Peer parenting was attempted again beginning in February 1997. It was necessary to begin at 
the beginning because the parents had retained nothing from the previous sessions. The parents were 
not receptive to the peer parent because they felt that she was more interested in persuading them to 
use birth control than in teaching parenting skills. 
In March a bonding assessment evaluation was conducted on the baby, the parents and the 
foster parents by the Family and Attachment Center, the conclusion of which was that there was no 
significant bond between the baby and the parents and that the parents lacked the basic parenting 
skills necessary to care for her emotional and physical well-being. Conversely the baby exhibited 
secure healthy and normal parent/child attachment to the foster parents. 
Also in March a second parenting class was offered to the parents. They failed to attend any 
of the classes but did attend five of six sessions arranged independent of DCFS by the parents' 
attorney with the attorney's sister, who had taught parenting classes in the past. The parents missed 
approximately one-half of the scheduled visits with the baby in March and April. On some of those 
visits the parents showed up late after the baby and the foster parents had left. Peer parenting 
continued through April with no significant change in parenting skills. The baby was treating the 
visits as visits with strangers or at best acquaintances, but not as parents, with some increasing anxiety 
and some sleep loss after the visits. The parents seemed uncomfortable and relieved to get the visits 
over with. 
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The court terminated the DCFS obligation to attempt to reunify the family on April 24, 1997. 
Since that time there has been no visitation or other communication between the parents and the baby 
and the parents have made to efforts to change their circumstances. The baby has become evermore 
integrated and attached to the only family she has ever known. At no time have the parents ever 
contributed to the cost of caring for the baby. They have never been financially able to do so. and 
no contribution has been solicited. The foster parents wish to adopt. They appear able and willing 
in every way to provide for the needs of this child as they have done since her birth. 
E. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION 
The court concludes that the parents have exhibited a conscious disregard of their parental 
obligations which has lead to the destruction of the parent child relationship. Therefore, as alleged 
in the foster parents' petition, the parents have abandoned the child within the definition of Utah 
Code Annotated 78-3a-407(l). 
The mother has neglected this child within the meaning of 78-3a-407(2) by repeated or 
continuous failure to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, education or other 
care necessary for the physical, mental, and emotional health and development of the child, the 
mother being capable of providing such care. 
The father is unfit or incompetent within the meaning of 78-3a-407(3) in that his mental 
deficiency renders him unable to care for the immediate and continuous physical or emotional 
needs of the child for an extended period of time. 
This child has been in an out of home placement since birth, and DCFS for a period of 12 
months made diligent efforts to provide appropriate services. The parents neglected, refused or 
were unwilling or unable to remedy the circumstances that caused the out of home placement. 
The court notes that the 78-3a-407(4) does not require that the circumstances to be remedied are 
those which caused the original removal. Rather the statute requires the remedying of the 
circumstances that cause out of home placement. In other words, the causes of the out of home 
placement are fluid as dangers to the child change while the child is in out of home placement. 
While the primary cause of the original removal was the need to train the parents on the operation 
of the heart/breath monitor, it immediately became clear that the parents were not capable of 
providing the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter or other care necessary for her physical, 
mental and emotional health and development. This parental unfitness caused the continued out 
of home placement and must be considered in an analysis of 78-3a-407(4) along with those causes 
of the initial removal. Further, there is a substantial likelihood that the parents will not be capable 
of exercising proper parental care in the near future. 
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The parents have been unable or unwilling within a reasonable time to substantially correct 
the circumstances that lead to the placement, notwithstanding reasonable and appropriate efforts 
by DCFS to return the child to the parents. Specifically the parents have failed to comply 
substantially with two different treatment plans. This child was removed from the parents' 
custody as a baby and has been out of their custody for over a year and one-half, the childs entire 
life, in spite of a diligent effort by DCFS at reunification. Again, the circumstances which lead 
to the placement of the child are not limited to the original removal, but rather include other 
circumstances which developed during the placement and which prevent return of the child to her 
parents. This failure of parental adjustment has been notwithstanding reasonable and appropriate 
efforts by DCFS to return the child to the parents. 
The parents have made only token efforts and in some cases no efforts at all to support or 
communicate with the child, to eliminate the risk of serious physical, mental or emotional abuse, 
and to avoid being unfit in accordance with 78-3a-407(6). 
The court concludes that while parental rights are constitutionally protected, the legislature 
is not prevented from altering the statutory grounds for termination. Protecting children and 
providing permanency for them are compelling state interests. The addition of Section (4), (5), 
and (6) to 78-3a-407 was within the province of the legislature to do, and these subsections are 
not arbitrary or capricious, and therefore are not unconstitutional. 
B. BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD 
After consideration of the physical, mental and emotional needs of the child, the efforts that 
the parents have made to adjust to make it in the child's best interest to return home within a 
reasonable time, the lack of regular visitation and the failure to maintain regular contact and 
communication, the court concludes that it is in the best interest of this child that the parent/child 
relationship between her and her natural parents be terminated. 
This child has become integrated into the foster family to the extent that her familial identity 
is with that family. The foster family is able and willing to permanently treat the child as a 
member of the family. There exists a love, affection and other emotional ties between the child 
and the foster parents which does not exist between the child and the parents. The capacity and 
disposition of the foster parents to give the child love, affection and guidance and to continue the 
education of the child far surpasses the capacity and disposition of the parents. The length of time 
in a stable satisfactory foster home and the desirability of continuing to live there, and the 
permanence of the foster family as a unit all make it in the best interest of this child that she 
remain in the foster home. 
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ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ADJUDGED, ORDERED AND DECREED: That the parent/child 
relationship between this child and her parents be terminated. A review hearing shall be held 
within 90 days if this child has not been permanently placed by then. The Assistant Attorney 
General is directed to draft Findings and Conclusions and an Order within 15 days consistent with 
this decision. 
Dated this Q? day of November, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
Scott N. Johansen, Judge 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM W I I " 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Edwin T. Peterson #3849 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM #1231 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Attorney for State of Utah 
140 West 425 South (330-15) 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Telephone: (801) 722-6546 
IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the interest of: 
MACE, Nicole Ann 04/22/96 
A person(s) under 18 years of age. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSION S OF LAW AND ORDER 
TERMINATING PARENTAL RIGHTS 
Case No. 909850 
Judge: Scott N. Johanson 
This matter came before the Honorable Scott N. Johanson for trial on the State of Utah's 
Verified Petition for Termination of Parental Rights with respect to the parental rights of Dennis 
Mace and Amy Opshal Mace to the above-named Child on the 28th and 29th day of October, 
1997 at 9:30 a.m. Edwin T. Peterson, Assistant Attorney General, appeared on behalf of the 
State of Utah, Division of Child and Family Services ("DCFS"). William McCairns was present 
as the representative of DCFS. Cleve Hatch appeared as the Guardian ad Litem for the above-
referenced child (the "Child"). Patricia Geary was present representing Dennis Mace and Amy 
r~ 
I DEC - I 1997 ' 
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Opsahl Mace, the natural parents of the above-named Child (the "Parents"), who were present. 
Clark Allred was present representing Rick and Stacy Myrin (the "Foster Parents"). 
Based on the exhibits presented into evidence by the parties, the testimony of the witnesses 
made in open court, the arguments and presentation of counsel, and the pleadings on file herein 
and good cause appearing, the Court hereby finds that it has jurisdiction over the matter and 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-104(l)(c) and Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-104(l)(e) et seq., the 
Termination of Parental Rights Act, makes the following findings of fact and order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. DCFS's Petition for Termination of Parental Rights was filed with this Court on or 
about May 8, 1997, by Edwin T. Peterson, the Assistant Attorney General. 
2. The contents of the petition are sufficient and in accordance with Utah Code Ann. 
§78-3a-405. 
3. Based on the evidence presented and upon the pleadings filed herein, the court finds 
that the petitioner has established the following facts by clear and convincing evidence: 
A. Nicole Mace was born on April 22, 1996 to Dennis Mace and Amy Opsahl. 
Hospital staff made a referral to the Division of Child and Family Services (hereinafter DCFS) 
based on a lack of bonding between the mother and the baby, and a need for special care relative 
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to a heart monitor. The child was taken into custody on April 24, 1996 and a petition for custody 
filed by DCFS was adjudicated on June 5, 1996. 
B. The court returned the child to the parents under Protective Supervision. The child 
was hospitalized on June 5 and hospital staff refiised to release her to her parents until the parents 
were trained in CPR and in the operation of the heart monitor. 
C. Because the parents did not avail themselves of the necessary training, a new petition 
was filed on June 10 seeking custody be placed with DCFS. 
D. The baby was taken into protective custody on June 10 for the second time pursuant 
to this second petition. Up to that time she had been in DCFS custody or in the hospital but never 
in the parent's custody. Temporary custody was granted by the court on June 12, 1996, after 
which DCFS began to implement a reunification plan which consisted of visitation between the 
parents and the baby as often as possible, establishment of a home appropriate for a newborn, 
having the parents learn parenting skills, CPR skills and heart and breath monitor skills. 
E. While this written treatment plan was very poorly drafted, almost devoid of the 
specificity necessary to be understood and carried out by low functioning parents, nevertheless 
DCFS made diligent efforts to provide services. 
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F. A peer parent was provided to supervise visits and to teach parents appropriate 
parenting techniques. Peer parenting is an expensive and intensive program where an individual 
spends time with the parents, often daily, and often at all hours of the night, teaching them basic 
minimum parental functions which competent parents may take for granted, such as not feeding 
a newborn solid foods, changing diapers periodically, and how to bathe a baby. This peer 
parenting began immediately on June 12 with the goal of reuniting the baby with the parents as 
soon as possible. Initially the parents exhibited a lack of interest in caring for the baby, though 
limited progress was made. 
G. Monitor training was arranged, the home was visited and inspected by DCFS, 
psychological evaluations for the parents were scheduled, and the DCFS worker and peer parent 
spent considerable time teaching and advising parents on things they needed to do. 
H. Visits of the child to the home gradually increased until overnight visits were 
allowed with die worker checking on the family late at night and early in the morning. The peer 
parent was in the home on thirteen different days within the first 30 days or so, and was on call 
whenever the parents had questions. She needed to be present or available to come to the home 
when the baby was there. 
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I. Through June, July and August of 1996, the parents passed the monitor training and 
visits were fairly regular. However, as time went on, the aunt, with whom the parents were 
living, began to handle the baby during visits, and on some occasions the parents weren't even 
present. When they were present the peer parent was frustrated that basic parenting skills had to 
be taught over and over again at each visit because the parents weren't retaining what they had 
been taught. 
J. The parent's living arrangements were unacceptable to DCFS because they were 
living with various relatives or others who were either unacceptable themselves because of prior 
substantiated sex abuse referrals or who's homes did not meet basic minimum standards of 
cleanliness. The family received attention from DCFS in one form or another on 33 different days 
from June 12 to August 30. 
K. In late August the parents appeared to begin to lose interest in the baby. The parents 
accepted the responsibility of requesting further visits. Visits became sporadic and then ceased. 
The parents continued to have unstable living arrangements. At one point DCFS and the parents' 
attorney lost track of the parents altogether because of their moving. They told the peer parent 
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they were moving but wouldn't say where, so they were instructed to call when they were ready 
for visits to resume. They had no phone or transportation so communications ceased. 
L. As the first treatment plan drew to a close at the end of 1996 the parents had 
complied with the requirement of receiving the monitor and had recently (on December 18) 
obtained suitable housing. They were in non-compliance with visitation and learning parenting 
skills. There were no visits whatsoever between August 27 and December 18, though there would 
have been visits arranged anytime the parents had asked or even made their whereabouts known. 
Without visits it was not possible for the peer parent to teach parenting skills. There was no other 
regular contact or communication with the baby during this period. 
M. Psychological assessments had been completed on both parents, the conclusions of 
which were that while the father lacked the cognitive abilities to care for himself without adult 
assistance, let alone care for and protect a baby, the mother was capable of learning parenting 
skills. 
N. Meanwhile the baby had been with the same foster parents since three days after her 
birth, was developing love, affection and emotional ties to those foster parents and was becoming 
integrated into the foster family to the extent that her family identification was becoming that of 
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the foster family. The foster home was stable and satisfactory. The baby was ahead 
developmentally and had outgrown the need for the heart and breath monitor. She recognized the 
foster parents as fulfilling the roles of parents in her life. 
0. A second reunification treatment plan was implemented with a beginning date of 
January 1, 1997, although the signatures bear the date of February 6, 1997. This treatment plan 
had more detail than the first one and therefore it was more easily understood and helpful to the 
parents. Visitation was still the key factor in reunification with the first four visits specified to 
be held at the DCFS office for one hour, all to be completed within four weeks. Thereafter the 
visits were allowed in the parents' home and could be longer. Transportation and cancellation 
policies were clear, as was designation of who could be present, and who was to supervise the 
visits. 
P. In addition, parenting classes were required, as well as appropriate housing, peer 
parenting, and a vague requirement to "explore occupational and educational opportunities" and 
to "plan financially for their family and work towards self-sufficiency." 
Q. Visits were re-established for December 23 but the parents' attorney failed to notify 
the parents and the first visit since August was January 2, 1997. Visits on January 16 and January 
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22 were both canceled because the baby was sick. Visits did take place on January 2, January 9 
and February 6, with no substantial problems but with some concerns. The parents canceled the 
visits for January 30 and February 13. 
R. During the months of January and February 1997 the parents failed to attend any 
parenting classes though everything had been arranged by DCFS for the parents to attend; nor did 
the parents make any effons toward exploring occupational or educational opportunities or in 
doing any financial planning to work toward self-sufficiency. The social worker went over the 
treatment plan very carefully with the parents to be sure that they understood and emphasized the 
urgency of immediately establishing a relationship with the baby. The parents did have clean and 
adequate housing. They failed to avail themselves of WIC (Well Infant Child) services which 
were free of cost to the parents, even though the social worker requested them to do so. 
S. Peer parenting was attempted again beginning in February 1997. It was necessary 
to begin at the beginning because the parents had retained nothing from the previous sessions. 
The parents were not receptive to the peer parent because they felt that she was more interested 
in persuading them to use birth control than in teaching parenting skills. 
< 
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T. In March a bonding assessment evaluation was conducted on the baby, the parents 
and the foster parents by the Family and Attachment Center, the conclusion of which was that 
there was no significant bond between the baby and the parents and that the parents lacked the 
basic parenting skills necessary to care for her emotional and physical well-being. Conversely 
the baby exhibited secure healthy and normal parent/child attachment to the foster parents. 
U. Also in March a second parenting class was offered to the parents. They failed to 
attend any of the classes but did attend five of six sessions arranged independent of DCFS by the 
parents' attorney with the attorney's sister, who had taught parenting classes in the past. The 
parents missed approximately one-half of the scheduled visits with the baby in March and April. 
On some of those visits the parents showed up late after the baby and the foster parents had left. 
Peer parenting continued through April with no significant change in parenting skills. The baby 
was treating the visits as visits with strangers or at best acquaintances, but not as parents, with 
some increasing anxiety and some sleep loss after the visits. The parents seemed uncomfortable 
and relieved to get the visits over with. 
V. The court terminated the DCFS obligation to attempt to reunify the family on April 
24, 1997. Since that time there has been no visitation or other communication between the parents 
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and the baby and the parents have made no efforts to change their circumstances. The baby has 
become evermore integrated and attached to the only family she has ever known. At no time have 
the parents ever contributed to the cost of caring for the baby. They have never been financially 
able to do so, and no contribution has been solicited. The foster parents wish to adopt. They 
appear able and willing in every way to provide for the needs of this child as they have done since 
her birth. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION 
A. The court concludes that the parents have exhibited a conscious disregard of their 
parental obligations which has lead to the destruction of the parent child relationship. Therefore, 
as alleged in the foster parents' petition, the parents have abandoned the child within the definition 
of Utah Code Annotated 78-3a-407(l). 
B. The mother has neglected this child within the meaning of 78-3a-407(2) by repeated 
or continuous failure to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, education or other 
care necessary for the physical, mental and emotional health and development of the child, the 
mother being capable of providing such care. 
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C. The father is unfit or incompetent within the meaning of 78-3a-407(3) in that his 
mental deficiency renders him unable to care for the immediate and continuous physical or 
emotional needs of the child for an extended period of time. 
D. This child has been in an out of home placement since birth, and DCFS for a period 
of 12 months made diligent efforts to provide appropriate services. The parents neglected, 
refused or were unwilling or unable to remedy the circumstances that caused the out of home 
placement. The coun notes that the 78-3a-407(4) does not require that the circumstances to be 
remedied are those which caused the original removal. Rather the statute requires the remedying 
of the circumstances that cause out of home placement. In other words, the causes of the out of 
home placement are fluid as dangers to the child change while the child is in out of home 
placement. While the primary cause of the original removal was the need to train the parents on 
the operation of the heart/breath monitor, it immediately became clear that the parents were not 
capable of providing the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter or other care necessary for 
her physical, mental and emotional health and development. This parental unfitness caused the 
continued out of home placement and must be considered in an analysis of 78-3a-407(4) along 
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with those causes of the initial removal. Further, there is a substantial likelihood that the parents 
will not be capable of exercising proper parental care in the near future. 
E. The parents have been unable or unwilling within a reasonable time to substantially 
correct the circumstances that lead to the placement, notwithstanding reasonable and appropriate 
efforts by DCFS to return the child to the parents. Specifically the parents have failed to comply 
substantially with two different treatment plans. This child was removed from the parents' 
custody as a baby and has been out of their custody for over a year and one-half, the child's entire 
life, in spite of a diligent effort by DCFS at reunification. Again, the circumstances which lead 
to the placement of the child are not limited to the original removal, but rather include other 
circumstances which developed during the placement and which prevent return of the child to her 
parents. This failure of parental adjustment has been notwithstanding reasonable and appropriate 
efforts by DCFS to return the child to the parents. 
F. The parents have made only token efforts and in some cases no effort at all to 
support or communicate with the child, to eliminate the risk of serious physical, mental or 
emotional abuse, and to avoid being unfit in accordance with 78-3a-407(6). 
( 
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G. The court concludes that while parental rights are constitutionally protected, the 
legislature is not prevented from altering the statutory grounds for termination. Protecting 
children and providing permanency for them are compelling state interests. The addition of 
Section (4), (5), and (6) to 78-3a-407 was within the province of the legislature to do, and these 
subsections are not arbitrary or capricious, and therefore are not unconstitutional. 
BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD 
A. After consideration of the physical, mental and emotional needs of the child, the 
efforts that the parents have made to adjust to make it in the child's best interest to return home 
within a reasonable time, the lack of regular visitation and the failure to maintain regular contact 
and communication, the court concludes that it is in the best interest of this child that the 
parent/child relationship between her and her natural parents be terminated. 
B. The child has become integrated into the foster family to the extent that her familial 
identity is with that family. The foster family is able and willing to permanently treat the child 
as a member of the family. There exists a love, affection and other emotional ties between the 
child and the foster parents which does not exists between the child and the parents. The capacity 
and disposition of the foster parents to give the child love, affection and guidance and to continue 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 14 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
Nicole Ann Mace 
the education of the child far surpasses the capacity and disposition of the parents. The length of 
time in a stable satisfactory foster home and the desirability of continuing to live there, and the 
permanency of the foster family as a unit all make it in the best interest of this child that she 
remain in the foster home. 
Upon consideration of the provisions set forth in Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-401 et seq, the 
court finds that it is in the best interests of the Child that the parental rights of Dennis Mace and 
Amy Opsahl Mace should be terminated. 
ORDER TERMINATING PARENTAL RIGHTS 
1. The statutory requirements having been met, the Court hereby terminates any and 
all parental rights of Dennis Mace and Amy Opsahl Mace to Nicole Ann Mace, born 04/22/96. 
2. That temporary care, custody, control and guardianship of Nicole Ann Mace is 
continued with DCFS for one (1) year unless modified by this court in the dispositional phase of 
this matter. 
3. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-413(l), this order shall divest the child and the 
parents of all legal rights, powers, immunities, duties, and obligations with respect to each other, 
except the right of the child to inherit from the parents. 
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5. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-413(2), this order does not disentitle the Child 
to any benefit due her from any third person, including, but not limited to, any Indian tribe, 
agency, state, or the United States. 
6. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-413(3), the parents shall forthwith neither be 
entitled to any notice of proceedings for the adoption of the child nor shall have any right to object 
to the adoption or to participate in any other placement proceedings. 
7. In accordance with Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-412, a review of this matter, including 
the dispositional phase of this matter, shall be held within 90 days. 
DATED this J[*~ day of ^ygmJlm , 1997. 
BY THE COURT 
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